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The paper seeks to explore North Korean refugees’ migratory 
trajectories and the lived experience of each stage of 
transient/temporal living in China and Australia. Emerging studies 
on onward migration challenge the view that sees migration as a 
linear process involving the departure of national origin and the 
permanent settlement of a destination country. Rather the research 
on onward migration understands “migratory journeys are multiple, 
iterative and fragmented, involving steps and stages,” (Della Puppa 
& King 2018: 14). This paper looks at how transient mobilities of 
North Korean refugees in the transnational migration journey 
construct migrant experiences in settled countries. By addressing 
key pull and push factors for North Korean defectors in each 
destination, coming to China and Australia and exploring various 
aspects of their living and working conditions and social networks, 
the paper gives insight into the unique experience of North Korean 
refugees as onward, often transient migrants, and addresses the 
problems that the refugees confront. It then proposes some practical 
programs and internationally appropriate policies that would 
facilitate the delivery of assistance to this community. This study is a 
valuable contribution to the emerging area of research on onward 
migration and temporary migration by offering an empirical case 
study of North Korean refugees.  
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North Koreans are on the move. This emerging trend has attracted both 
attention from the South Korean government and international 
community. Many South Korean media have reported this move as an 
exodus of North Korean refugees and ungrateful North Koreans who 
betrayed the hospitality of fellow South Korean citizens. Since the mid-
1990s when North Korea was severely hit by famine and economic 
crisis, a growing number of North Koreans have flocked to South 
Korea, most coming via China, Thailand and other Southeast Asian 
countries. To support these North Koreans, South Korea’s central and 
local governments enacted the North Korean refugee law in 1997 and 
implemented a series of programs to fund everything from housing and 
education to job training for the North Korean refugees.  
Despite these resettlement services, some North Korean 
defectors began to seek another asylum in foreign countries. In 
particular, since the passage of the US North Korean Human Rights Act 
(NKHRA) in 2004, an increasing number of North Korean defectors 
living in South Korea have been seeking refugee status in the US, 
Canada, Australia and Europe. Some 2000 to 3000 are estimated to live 
in the UK, the US, Australia and EU countries. Some 1,000 North 
Koreans have applied for asylum in the UK alone since 2004, 70 per 
cent of them presumably holding South Korean citizenship (Chosunilbo, 
15 July, 2011). Some North Koreans even seem to seek serial asylum. 
For example, up to 40 per cent of North Koreans in Canada are reported 
to be re-migrants from the UK (Kim, 2013). According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Global Trends 
2011 report, North Korean defectors who were given refugee status 
around the world in 2011 (not including South Korea and China) 
amounted to 1,052, with most migrating to the United Kingdom (603), 
then Germany (193), Canada (64), Belgium (31), Australia (29) and the 
United States (25). Since 2006, Australia has become one of the key 
destinations for North Korean defectors, along with the UK, Canada, the 
US and Norway.  
This paper approaches this mobility of North Korean refugees 
from a growing trend of onward migration and temporary migration. 
These days migration journey has become “multiple, iterative and 
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fragmented” (Della Puppa & King 2018: 14) and the nature of migration 
has become more temporal and not a one-directional flow, including one 
journey from a country of origin to permanent settlement in a chosen 
country. This paper aims to explore North Koreans’ migration 
trajectories from North Korea through China and South Korea to 
Australia. 
It is not easy to estimate how many North Korean defectors live 
in Australia. Data from the Refugee Council of Australia (see Table 1) 
show that 70 North Korean defectors were granted refugee settlement 
visas to Australia between 2000 and 2009. However, a considerable 
number of North Korean defectors are currently residing in Australia 
illegally whilst hiding from authorities after failing to obtain a refugee 
protection visa. Some of them face deportation to South Korea. One 
media report indicates that a total of 70 North Korean asylum seekers 
are currently in this situation in Australia (Stewart 2012). This paper 
seeks to explore this tiny group of North Koreans staying in Australia as 
secondary or multiple asylum seekers or temporary migrants on various 
visa schemes.  
 





2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
North 
Korea 
- - - 1 - - 26 - 23 20 70 
South 
Korea 
- - - - 1 - - - - - 1 
Source: Refugee Council of Australia (2011) 
 
Empirical evidence for this paper draws on studies of North 
Korean defectors in China, South Korea and elsewhere, media reports, 
non-participant observation, interviews with four North Koreans in 
northeast China1 in February 2013, and semi-structured interviews with 
eleven North Korean defectors and four support workers in Sydney in 
                                                          
1 To protect privacy and confidentiality, the details of interviews conducted in 
China are not included in the paper. Interviews with North Koreas in China 
were rather used for supplementary data. 
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April 2012 and April 2013. The field trip to Jilin province, Northeast of 
China was chosen to ‘feel’ and see the escaping trajectories from North 
Korea. China, in particular, bordering provinces and cities, like Jilin and 
Dandong, was the route when North Korean defectors flee from North 
Korea. Jilin province alone shares a 200 kilometre border with North 
Korea and most of it is split by the narrow Tumen River, which is 
shallow enough to wade across in summer or walk on when frozen in 
winter. 
To better understand the defection journey North Koreans have 
taken and their lives as temporal/transient migrants in China, the 
researcher visited bordering villages and places frequented by North 
Koreans, such as an ethnic Korean church, markets, shopping centres 
and restaurants run by North Koreans. In addition, the researcher met 
church missionaries, international NGO workers who had been working 
with North Koreans and people engaged in business-related activities 
with North Korea.  
In Australia, due to the small number of North Koreans living 
here, recruiting North Korean refugees and asylum seekers was 
challenging. Working to approach potential interview participants, the 
researcher contacted migration agents, organisations (Korean 
community local churches in Sydney, Korean community organisations 
and Asylum Seekers Centre) that are understood to have frequent 
contacts with North Korean refugees. Convenience and snowball 
techniques were used for the recruitment.  As a result, between April 
2012 to April 2013 eleven North Korean defectors were met, all of 
whom were based in Sydney at the time of the interviews, which is 
often the gateway for Koreans to enter Australia.   All interviews were 
conducted in Korean in places, at times, and in locations convenient to 
participants for two to three hours, and were recorded with participants’ 
consent. Interview questions included defection and migration process, 
the motivations behind their decision to leave North Korea and again 
South Korea, why Australia was chosen, and the experiences of living in 
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North Korean in China, Transients or Economic Migrants  
 
Most North Koreans who flee their home country head north for China. 
Estimates of the number of North Korean refugees residing in China are 
unhelpfully broad, and range from 60,000 to 300,000. It is believed that 
since famine struck in the mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of North 
Koreans have crossed the Tumen River into Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture in the northeast of China. They sought 
temporary employment or emergency relief from relatives in China and 
often returned to North Korea with cash and goods to ensure the 
survival of their families (Charny 2004: 77). North Koreans caught 
making unauthorised movement across the border with China usually 
face harsh punishment, the severity of which depends on authorities’ 
assessment of intent. Temporarily travelling for trade in China is 
considered less serious, but those whom authorities believe to be en-
route to South Korea are likely to face arbitrary detention, torture and 
forced labour. The severity of the punishment facing repatriated North 
Koreans cannot be underestimated and has been reported on extensively. 
Nevertheless, those that manage to live in China have no legal rights, 
are not entitled to any government assistance, and live under constant 
fear of arrest and deportation. The severity of human rights abuses in 
North Korea itself notwithstanding, the plight of this often clandestine 
community in China and elsewhere, like Australia, deserves wider 
international attention.  
Although a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, China does not recognise 
North Korean defectors as refugees, and instead considers them to be 
illegal migrants who cross the border for economic reasons. Indeed, 
China has no refugee adjudication process to determine refugee status 
and generally provides limited or no access to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assess the status of North 
Koreans crossing the border. Therefore, it has not been possible to 
ascertain how many North Koreans are seeking asylum in China 
because of a well-founded fear of political or other persecution.   
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China is concerned about the impact of potential large-scale 
outflows from North Korea on North Korea’s stability (Cohen 2012)2. 
China also has sovereign treaties with the DPRK, including agreements 
from the early 1960s, and more recently one concluded in 1986, 
obliging it to deport illegal migrants and criminals seeking to cross the 
border from North Korea (Charny 2004: 81). Since the mid-1990s, 
China has repatriated tens of thousands of North Koreans, despite 
requests from human rights groups to acknowledge them as refugees. 
North Koreans in China have no legal rights, are not entitled to any 
government assistance, and live under constant fear of arrest and 
deportation.  
Most North Koreans staying in China are seen as 
temporal/transient migrants no matter whether they come to work with 
legal permit (as a factory worker) or they are staying temporarily to go 
to South Korea or another country. To flee from North Korea some 
North Koreans even volunteer to be trafficked or indentured. Those 
transients who prepare for asylum seeking to another country live under 
constant fear of arrest and deportation.   Compulsory repatriation to 
North Korea entails severe punishment, making defectors cling to 
whatever harsh alternatives they have.  To survive in China and/or to 
avoid Chinese authorities, most seek assistance from the Korean 
Chinese community, South Korean church networks and humanitarian 
NGOs. Their supports are also critical for the asylum seeking process, 
such as traveling to third countries including Thailand, Vietnam, 
Mongolia and Laos, in an attempt to enter South Korean diplomatic 
posts in order to apply for asylum in South Korea. Crossing these other 
borders often requires hiring assistance from brokers. 
Despite attempts by both Chinese and North Korean authorities 
to tighten security along the border and North Korea’s intensification of 
the crackdown on attempted defections, North Koreans have been 
willing to take the risk for a range of reasons. A study based on 
                                                          
2 In December 2017, there were several media reports indicating that China is 
quietly building a network of refugee camps along its border with North Korea 
as it prepares for the human exodus in case of an internal conflict or the 
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interviews with 75 North Koreans in 2003 and 2004 found that North 
Koreans left their country for various reasons, including food 
deprivation following the collapse of the public food distribution 
system, loss of employment as state enterprises ceased to function, the 
death of family members in the famine, and health problems (personally, 
or of a family member) which led individuals to seek money for 
medicine in China (Refugees International 2005).  Another study found 
that some North Koreans left their country simply in pursuit of a better 
life (Lee, 2006). Among the four interviewed in China for the current 
research, three came to China to earn money, one to seek help from 
relatives living in China, and one female in her mid-fifties was trying to 
make money for her daughter’s upcoming wedding through labour 
work, such as a kitchen hand and a housemaid.  One female participant 
in her late sixties worked as a housemaid and one male in his mid-
sixties worked as a security guard for a construction site in a remote and 
isolated area. Both said that they worked hard for their families in North 
Korea who were in a desperate situation and in need of urgent financial 
help.  
Both the Refugees International (2005) report and Chang, 
Haggard and Noland’s (2006) survey indicated that the majority of the 
North Koreans coming to China in the mid-2000s were from North 
Hamgyong province. This province borders China and is one of the 
poorest provinces in the country. It was hit hardest by the famine and 
food shortages of the 1990s (Smith 2002; Haggard and Noland 2005, 
2007). It has also been argued that both North and South Hamgyong 
provinces were “deliberately cut off from national and international 
food assistance during the famine as part of a ‘triage’ strategy to 
husband scarce food resources” (Charney 2004: 80). The support and 
protection provided by the Korean communities thriving in the three 
northeastern provinces of China (Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning) is 
one of the pull factors that have encouraged North Koreans to cross the 
border as a viable avenue for survival (Lee 2006).  
No matter what reasons they come to China, their experience as 
transient/temporal, often illegal, migrants is far from what they have 
expected when they decided to escape extreme circumstances at home. 
Several research reports on North Korean defectors in China highlight 
that they continue to experience suffering and deprivation in China 
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(Chang, Haggard & Noland 2006; Charny 2004; Lee 2006; Lee 2009).  
The North Koreans in China struggle to meet their basic needs 
(Refugees International 2005) and lack employment opportunities in 
addition to fearing arrest. They experience low levels of employment 
due to fear of detection, the lack of papers such as a “hukou” (residence 
permit) or a “shenfenzheng” (ID card), or lack of skills, including 
language skills. In Chang’s (2006) survey, only 22 percent of those 
interviewed were formally employed. Most work in the informal 
economy as farm workers at orchards or at sheep farms in remote areas; 
kitchen hands at restaurants; housemaids; low-wage nurses, and as 
security guards (Lee, 2006). These uncertain circumstances of being an 
illegal/ temporal migrant take a significant toll on individuals’ emotional 
and psychological wellbeing as well as physical wellbeing. North 
Korean refugees in China often suffer from anxiety and depression 
associated with the uncertainty of their circumstances, as well as the 
loss associated with their severed ties with North Korea (Chang, 
Haggard & Noland 2006). Two participants for the research were in a 
critical situation, one male participant had serious eye problems, 
probably due to malnutrition for a long period of time. Another female 
in her late sixties required medical treatment. At her age, 24 hour a day 
duties as a housemaid/nanny might be too difficult to endure for her 
fragile, sick body. Due to their 'overstay' visa status, they were not able 
to receive medical treatment urgently required.  
Those North Koreans living in China receive help mostly from 
the ethnic Korean community in China. Some 88 percent of Chang’s 
(2006) interviewees reported receiving help from Korean Chinese and 
three-quarters reported living with Korean Chinese.  The Korean 
communities in China have a very strong “intra-ethnic solidarity” 
(Charny 2004: 81), and many of them feel a deep personal indebtedness 
to their North Korean relatives and friends who provided them with 
considerable support and assistance during the difficult period of the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution. Consequently, the Korean ethnic 
community, individually and at regional levels, have extended 
significant support and protection for North Korean escapees, 
particularly in the early phase of the food shortages (Lee 2006). In more 
recent times this goodwill has been tested. Some North Korean 
defectors have allegedly been involved in crimes including robbery, 
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murder, and human trafficking. Providing assistance has also become 
more risky. Since the early 2000s Chinese authorities have tightened up 
policies toward North Korean defectors, making it very difficult for the 
Korean communities in China to extend protection to the North Korean 
escapees (Lee 2006). 
It is widely known that many individual Christian churches or 
church groups have been covertly involved in the protection and support 
of North Korean defectors in China. Most of these groups provide basic 
support, such as food, shelter and clothing, but some extend to 
providing physical protection from arrest and deportation. In special 
cases, some South Korean organisations arrange transit to South Korea 
(Lee 2006). It is not surprising to find that five percent of the 
participants in Chang’s survey responded that they lived with 
missionaries/Christian workers (Chang, Haggard & Noland 2006). One 
male interviewee also received some assistance from a church minister 
and Christian workers.  
The risks for North Korean women in China are particularly 
high (Lee 2009). By the mid-1990s, more North Korean men had fled to 
China than women. However, recently, more and more North Korean 
women have crossed the border. They are in serious danger of being 
trafficked for prostitution, forced labour and forced marriage. 3 
According to the 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report (US Department of 
State 2012), there are thousands of undocumented North Koreans in 
northeast China, and about 70 percent of them are women. Female 
defectors are easily exposed to sexual violence and forced marriage to 
meet the demand caused by China’s gender imbalance. According to the 
CEO of the Seoul-based human rights group Helping Hands Korea, Tim 
Peters, “[S]eventy to 90 percent of North Korean women in China fall 
into trafficking" (cited in Strother 2012). 
A growing number of young North Korean women, mostly 
under the age of 25, are also lured to cross the border by brokers and 
peer North Koreans who make false promises of what is described to 
them as “computer-related” jobs in China. Instead, it has been reported 
                                                          
3 There are some cases that women voluntarily take these risks as a survival 
strategy for them and their families, with many remitting money to relatives 
that remain in North Korea.  
10 
 
When will the ‘Arduous Journey’ End? 
 
that they are forced to work for online sex sites and even work in voice 
phishing (KINU 2011)4. The story of Choe, cited in the Chosun Ilbo 
below, illustrates the typical experiences of young North Korean women 
in China:  
 
One woman identified only by her surname Choe (25) was 
arrested along with a Chinese national also identified only by his 
family name Shi, reports said. She was quoted as saying she 
lived a "rough life" after being targeted by human traffickers. 
Choe said she crossed the border into China in 2007 at the age 
of 19 after finishing high school in order to make money for her 
family. But instead of finding a job in China, she was sold to a 
mentally disabled man in Heilongjiang Province. She realized 
she was a victim of human trafficking, but her inability to 
communicate in Chinese made it impossible for her to escape. A 
few months later, she was sold to another Chinese man and had 
his child. Choe met Shi early last year after he was released 
from prison after serving time for human trafficking and helped 
him recruit other North Koreans for their human trafficking ring, 
Chinese police said. They lured 20 North Korean women 
between in their 20s to 40s to China. The gang were paid 
10,000-15,000 yuan per woman, and accomplices in North 
Korea 3,000-5,000 yuan. Before selling the women, they 
confined the women in a room where they were forced to 
perform sexual acts on the Internet. Chinese media said nine 
North Korean women were confined in three rooms when police 
raided their quarters (Chosunilbo, 17 January, 2013). 
  
Another distressing issue is the increasing number of children 
born to North Korean mothers and Chinese fathers. It is estimated that 
there are between 15,000 and 50,000 such children (KINU 2010). The 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) estimates that 
there are some 10,000 children under the age of 19, born in China to 
                                                          
4 In voice phishing, a caller will imitate a bank, police officer, or other official 
who needs to find out someone’s bank account information to trick the target 
into giving them money. 
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North Korean mothers, based on the estimates by South Korean NGOs 
and researchers at Johns Hopkins University. Some NGO groups 
working with North Korean defectors from China estimate that there are 
as many as 50,000 stateless orphans. They have been deprived of formal 
education, medical services and other social support. According to a 
NHRCK report, based on interviews with 100 children born to defecting 
North Korean mothers in 14 regions in China's Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang and Shandong provinces in 2012, only 21 of the children 
lived with their North Korean birth mother, and 20 lived with their father 
only. Another 39 were looked after by grandparents or relatives, and 20 
lived in shelters run by evangelical missionaries. The NHRCK report has 
found that the main reason these children are abandoned is because 
China deported the mothers back to North Korea, accounting for 36 
percent. Another 31 percent said the family broke down when the 
mother left the family, mostly by going to South Korea. To register the 
child, the father is required to prove that the mother has been deported 
back to North Korea. Another reported reason for abandonment was that 
the Chinese fathers did not have the money to rear the child (NHRCK 
2012). There is a clear need for the international community to recognise 
the plight of these North Korean defectors, including trafficked women 
and children in China and to develop appropriate policies and programs. 
Not all North Koreans wish to leave China because they want to 
continue to live nearby their families and make contact with their 




Mobility of North Korean Refugees from South Korea to Australia: 
Asylum Seekers and Onward Migrants  
 
According to the interviewees and data from the Refugee Council of 
Australia (Table 1), North Koreans began coming to Australia in the 
mid-2000s.  The Refugee Council of Australia data indicate that in 
2006, 26 North Koreans were granted a refugee protection visa. This 
might trigger the interest of North Korean refugees in South Korea with 
respect to onward migration to Australia. The interviewees for this 
research seemed to agree that more North Koreans came to Australia in 
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late 2007 and 2008.  One man who came here in November 2007 
claimed that he was the first North Korean defector in Australia. 
Another female participant, who had been living in Sydney since June 
2008, suggested that she was the first. The participants estimated that 
there were between 60 and 70 North Koreans living in Sydney in 2011. 
After the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) began to 
crack down on illegal or overstaying North Korean defectors in January 
and February 2012, that number has fallen to approximately forty. With 
the crackdown by immigration officers and the slim possibility of 
securing a Protection Visa, more North Koreans are likely to return to 
South Korea. At the time of writing, five out of the eleven interviewed 
for this study have already left Australia for South Korea.  
North Koreans interviewed for this research chose to come to 
Australia with a hope of obtaining a permanent refugee visa. Five said 
that they falsely claimed that they came to Australia directly from 
China, hiding the fact they had already been settled in South Korea and 
granted South Korean citizenship. Two came to Australia directly from 
China with fabricated documents. Six failed to obtain a Protection Visa 
and three were living on temporary visas while exploring other ways of 
securing permanent residency. Two sought to marry Australian citizens 
and two secured student visas. Only one participant came to Australia 
on a South Korean working holiday visa exploring the possibility of 
permanent settlement. Two of the participants came to Australia after 
their refugee claims in the UK had failed. The migratory journey for 
these two involved many locations – China to South Korea, South 
Korea to UK, UK to South Korea and South Korea to Australia. Other 
than the two, the migration trajectories involve journey from North 
Korea to China, from China to South Korea (often via a very short stay 
in a third country) and from South Korea to Australia. As mentioned 
earlier, if the asylum seeking has failed, most North Koreans in 
Australia return to South Korea and/ or they are likely to plan to move 
to another county.  Their migration journey has been a circular, 
fragmented and ruptured one, made of a series of temporal stays in 
different locations.  
Under Australian law, North Korean asylum seekers are 
considered to be dual citizens of both North and South Korea and are 
typically deported to South Korea within 14 days (Stewart 2012). As 
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many as 80 North Korean asylum seekers were thrown into this 
situation in 2011, when the High Court said refugees cannot stay here if 
they are entitled to protection in a third country (Piotrowski 2013a). It 
appears that some Chinese citizens of Korean descent pretend to be 
North Korean defectors in order to acquire refugee status in Australia, 
the UK and other EU countries. These ethnic Koreans, often illegal 
immigrants from China, study North Korean history, songs, geography, 
and its political system. In some cases, they even present North Korean 
notes, birth certificates, IDs, and other official documents. Sometimes, 
even legitimate North Koreans fail to prove their nationality, finding 
that North Korean bank notes or Kim Il Sung badges are not valid 
evidence of their nationality. Indeed, this kind of North Korean 
‘merchandise’ can be purchased online (Choi 2011). One female 
participant suggested that not a single genuine North Korean defector 
has been granted a Refugee Protection Visa in Australia, and that all of 
those who had received a visa were ethnic Koreans from China. 
Some of the interviewees were reluctant to tell their true stories. 
Some implied that to get refugee status they had to employ unlawful 
methods. For example, one male participant who came to Australia 
directly from China in November 2007, described how he came to 
Australia with a broker’s help. His story was remarkably similar to that 
reported in a story that appeared in The Australian about a North Korean 
refugee who came to Australia in March 2011 and failed to be granted a 
Protection Visa by the Australian Department of Immigration.    
Growing up in North Korea, Mr Jeong had never heard of 
Australia. He didn't even know it was a country. But in one of 
the towns along the Chinese border where many Koreans lived, 
he heard Australia was a place he could go, live in peace, and 
make money working as a welder. Mr Jeong made friends with 
a wealthy local businessman who ran a big supermarket and 
was involved in the people smuggling trade. They purchased a 
spot for him on a Chinese tour group's trip to Australia, buying 
a man's place, passport (which they got doctored) and all. Mr 
Jeong ditched the tour group when he got here, and on his 
second day in Sydney, he headed to the Department of 
Immigration, near the city's Central Station transport hub. He 
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approached the reception desk and cried: "North Korea! North 
Korea! North Korea!", as he had been told to say by the people 
smuggler. Officials granted Mr Jeong a bridging visa, which is a 
placeholder accreditation that allows people to stay in Australia 
while Immigration decides on their future. He did it rough, 
living in a Sydney hostel, even working as a welder in Horsley 
Park, in the city's far south-west. But in November 2011 he 
received a letter which said his application for a refugee 
protection visa had been rejected (Piotrowski 2013b). 
All participants except one said that they obtained information 
about seeking refugee status from friends and acquaintances, and that 
there were no professional brokers involved. However, as the above 
newspaper implies, there are brokers in China and South Korea who 
offer information and resources and help with refugee applications. 
Most of the participants had detailed knowledge of the refugee support 
programs of Australia and other countries, including the UK, the US, 
various EU countries and Canada. Through their onward migration, they 
seem to have accumulated ‘migratory knowledge’ (Ramos 2017) so that 




Motivation to Live in Australia and North Koreans’ Experience of 
Australian Life  
 
Given their relatively recent and limited numbers, very little is known 
about why North Koreans come to Australia or what it is like for North 
Korean defectors to live and work in Australia.  This section discusses 
some of the key pull and push factors for North Korean defectors 
coming to Australia and explores various aspects of their living and 
working conditions, including how they use (or fail to access) various 
social networks. Based on the interviews, reasons for leaving South 
Korea for Australia include access to education in English; a more 
relaxed education system; better social safety nets and the advanced 
welfare system (education and health); the chance to live in a cleaner 
natural environment and more broadly the hope that Australia could 
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deliver them a better life. It appears that many of the pull factors that 
attract North Koreans are applicable to many onward migrants moving 
to Australia. There is, however, one distinctive reason, which is to live 
far away from North Korea for the safety of their family members who 
are still living in North Korea and may have had additional difficulty, 
such as punishment and more close surveillance by authorities, due to 
their defection to South Korea. 
There are a range of push factors. Interviews with the defectors 
also reveal that they encountered a wide range of social and financial 
problems in South Korea. Cases of depression, psychological distress 
and family breakdown are disproportionately high among the North 
Korean refugee population (Haggard & Noland 2011; Jeong 2009; Yi et 
al. 2007, 2009). These problems may arise both from extensive periods 
of time spent hiding in unstable, dangerous conditions in China, and 
difficulty adapting to life in South Korea. 
All interviewees expressed their desire to raise their children 
without the stigma of being North Korean. Prejudice and discrimination 
among South Koreans was another push factor despite their common 
ethnicity. According to a recent report published by the National Human 
Rights Commission, South Korea (2016), most North Koreans living in 
South Korea hide their North Korean background to avoid 
discrimination. Two interviewees who were working as welders in 
Australia mentioned that in South Korea they pretended they were from 
Gangwondo in South Korea [its accent and dialect are similar to a North 
Korean accent] to avoid discrimination and prejudice against them. The 
same report indicated that North Korean refugees in South Korea are 
reluctant to reveal their identity and mingle with South Koreans in their 
local community and workplaces because of the attitude of South 
Koreans towards them. Prejudice and discrimination against North 
Koreans have affected the overall life of North Koreans in South Korea, 
including their employment. A female interviewee in her mid-thirties 
who came to Australia in 2008 said:  
I would like to get rid of my North Korean identity. In 
South Korea, when I look for a job, my accent and 
[slightly different] use of the Korean language were 
16 
 
When will the ‘Arduous Journey’ End? 
 
barriers to getting employed. I didn’t like the thought of 
my children suffering due to their ‘North Korean tag’.  
Most interviewees also reported that they struggled financially 
in South Korea. This is in line with the findings of other studies. 
According to a survey of 1,785 North Korean refugees resettled in 
South Korea, in 2014, only 53.1 percent were employed and that 19.8 
percent were employed as casuals (Korea Hana Foundation 2014). Both 
of these statistics indicated a worse situation for North Koreans than the 
general population, with Swouth Korea’s total employment rate at 60.8 
percent, and its casual employee rate at 6.1 percent. They earn less than 
their South Korean counterparts, earning on average KRW1.47 million 
per month, compared to the national average of KRW2.23 million 
(AUD$1, approximately KRW 840).  
As discussed, there are a multiplicity of interlocking 
motivations behind onward migration and secondary asylum seeking. 
Despite these expectations of a better life in Australia, their “new” life 
has its challenges. Their temporal often undefined legal status is the 
main constraint in Australian life. Some lived in fear of arrest and 
deportation because of 'overstay'. One male participant in his mid-
thirties came to Australia in November 2010 and applied for a refugee 
protection visa with his wife and two children. His application was 
declined and his family had already left for South Korea, but he 
remained in Sydney while working as a cleaner. He told the researcher 
that he could not visit a doctor even when he was sick because of his 
visa status and due to his ill health and high costs of living, he could 
hardly send money to his family in South Korea nowadays. Later he was 
caught by the immigration police and finally deported to South Korea. 
A couple came to Australia in June 2008 and gave birth to two children 
aged two and four years old in Australia. At the time of the interview in 
2012, and unlike their expectation, their refugee applications were 
rejected. Their main concern was their children’s education. They could 
not send their children to childcare or kindergarten. The 37 year-old 
wife and mother told of her family’s desperate situation:  
 
While waiting for the outcomes of our applications for the 
protection visa, we hoped that we could finally live in a country 
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without discrimination, and that we didn’t have to wander again 
in pursuit of a better life. We felt happy and secure. In 
particular, given that I gave birth to two children in Australia, I 
strongly believed that the Australian government would not 
send us back to South Korea, and that they would certainly 
grant us a protection visa. We studied English very hard. After 
being rejected, I was very stressed out; ‘What should I do?’ I 
thought, and, ‘Where should I go from here?’ I am most 
concerned about my children’s future. In this situation where 
we are staying on temporary visa in Australia, we can’t send our 
children to school. …Medical costs are another problem. My 
second child didn’t get vaccinated because we didn’t have AUD 
$180. We could barely afford milk and nappies... I hope some 
charity organisations can support us, who are in a desperate 
need.  
 
Most North Korean defectors interviewed suffer financial 
difficulties and experience professional devaluation and deskilling due 
to their language barrier as well as their temporal status.  While their 
refugee protection applications are being processed, they are normally 
entitled to social welfare support, health care and education. However, 
once their applications are declined they can no longer access these 
services and instead they must support themselves and their families, 
often by doing casual and labour intensive work. Their lack of English 
competency has limited their employment opportunities. The majority 
of the North Korean defectors interviewed were working in informal 
sectors, such as cleaning, painting, shop-keeping and tiling, mostly in 
Australian-Korean owned small businesses. Some said that they have 
never done this menial work either in South Korea or North Korea. 
Their jobs were mostly casual, precarious and cash-in-hand. They 
typically worked 50-70 hours per week. This type of work does not 
require any legal documents or English language ability.  A male painter 
in the early fifties said, "Communication is a big problem. For example, 
now I have become very good at painting, I could have started my own 
business, but my English has prevented me from proceeding with this 
plan. I am just a casual labourer”.  
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Most of those interviewed lived in Korean ethnic enclaves with 
a high concentration of Koreans near railway stations, such as the 
Sydney suburbs of Strathfield and Lidcombe, where many Korean 
businesses and shops are located. One interviewee mentioned that 
“although we live in Australia geographically, we still live in South 
Korea”. This has also led to limited social interaction with ‘mainstream’ 
Australians. They mostly spent time with other North Koreans, Chinese 
Koreans and Korean Australians. Some even said that they were very 
socially isolated from so-called mainstream Australian society.  
The high living expenses and unexpected poor quality and expensive 
housing were other disappointments to North Korean refugees living in 
Sydney.  One female interviewee in her early thirties who came to 
Australia in May 2011 with her daughter commented on her frustration 
of the quality of housing:  
 
As you know, in Korea I owned my unit, although that was 
provided by the Korean government. The unit was clean and its 
internal layout was convenient to live in. In Australia, the places 
I have lived were dirty, cold, no central heating system and 
often very shabby.  
 
All interviewees lived in shared units with other people, usually 
other North Korean defectors and Chinese Koreans or in a boarding 
house, often run by a North Korean defector. As renting an entire house 
or unit was well beyond their means, these might be the only options for 
temporal, often illegal migrants. For example, the weekly rent for a two 
bedroom unit in Strathfield was approximately between AUD $500 to 
$600 at the time of the interviews. Two of the homes visited showed the 
extent of their poor living conditions and their liminal status of being 
unsettled and ready to depart at any time. One place was a tiny unit 
inside a small commercial building near a railway station. The only 
furniture the owner had was a mattress to sleep on. Another house was 
very run-down, and there was little furniture. To earn extra income 
while raising her two children, the female defector rented the house at a 
cheaper rate from her church member and used to run a boarding house 
for fellow North Korean refugees. She mentioned that from 2012 many 
North Korean defectors began to return to South Korea after their 
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refugee applications were declined and that she was going to close down 
the boarding house and move to a smaller unit to save money.   
Ironically, North Korean refugees living in Australia have 
experienced downward mobility, unlike their expectation of social-
economic upward mobility. They even remain in lower-status/unskilled 
jobs.  Some interviewees said that their lives as precarious labourers in 
Australia were even worse than their lives in North Korea, let alone 
their lives in South Korea. The male interviewee in his thirties who 
worked as a cleaner said that in South Korea, “I felt like I almost 
reached the middle class, as my income was four to five million won 
[approximately AUD 5000 to 6000] in a month. I had my own house, 
although that was offered to me by the government. My family and I 
saved enough money to buy the most luxurious car in our 
neighbourhood, so that my South Korean neighbours would not look 
down upon us.” Another male interviewee in his fifties also lamented: 
 
My life [in Australia] is definitely worse than the life I lived in 
North Korea. I worked for a big company in the North. Once I 
was jailed for being involved in illegal activities in the North 
[he didn’t reveal the nature of the activities to the researcher]. In 
the North, education and health care is free. I couldn't imagine 
that my life in Australia ended up working as a Nogada [casual 
labour] living hand to mouth.  
 
Some were very frustrated by the poor quality of life, including 
the speed of internet in Australia compared to the advanced information 
technology in South Korea. A 27 year-old male interviewee who came 
to Australia in February 2012 and worked at a farm and as a shop 
assistant told of his disappointment about living in Australia. He paid 
AUD 125 a week for a shared room with three other people and often 
had AUD 3 lunches at McDonald’s to cope with the high living 
expenses in Sydney: 
 
I would like to say to those who plan to go overseas, don’t go 
overseas with false expectations. Having spent some time in 
Australia, I realised that living in Korea is more comfortable for 
Koreans [including North Koreans]…I didn’t know that [South] 
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Korea is such a developed country to live in. For young people 
like me, [South] Korea is the best place to live in.  
 
It is also noteworthy that most interviewees felt closer to South 
Korea than North Korea or Australia, and most of them are very proud 
of being Korean in Australia given the well-recognised South Korean 
companies like Samsung, Hyundai, LG and Kia. Also, South Korean 
culture, in particular, pop culture, has attracted more attention from the 
Australian media and general public in Australia in recent years. One 
female interviewee remarked that when she watched an SBS (Special 
Broadcast Services) program about K-Pop songs every week, she felt 
very proud of being Korean. Their experiences in Australia have helped 
them evaluate the South Korean government’s settlement support, and 
South Korea in general, in an objective and positive way. In particular, 
given that they were living in a shared unit or a boarding house, most of 
the interviewed considered the housing support from the South Korean 
government more generous than ones in other countries. It is evident 
that they have not decided to leave South Korea because of their 
dissatisfaction with South Korean settlement services. 
Most of the North Koreans were in need of legal, financial and 
emotional support. However, there are no formal support services in 
place in Australia. A staff member from the Asylum Seekers Centre 
(ASC) confirmed that a few North Korean defectors have contacted the 
ASC for legal support and English learning. ASC provides a range of 
services, including legal advice, English classes, an employment 
program, health care support and a leisure program.  The defectors 
gained informal support mostly from local churches in the Korean 
community. Local churches offer a range of support services including 
settlement, employment, visa application guidance, and tutoring and 
study advice for North Korean children. As churches have played a 
critical role in the defection process from North Korea to South Korea 
and in China, it seems that the local Korean church community has 
generously supported North Koreans, as demonstrated in an interview 
with a male in his fifties:  
 
The church I have been attending now gave our family a car so 
that I could drive to work. I couldn’t get a job because driving a 
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car is essential for working as a painter. One day before 
Christmas Day last year, I didn't get to work because I didn’t 
have a car. … A church deacon gave a car to my wife. I was 
astounded by their generosity. Although it was a very old 
second-hand car, it wasn’t something that could be given away 
so easily.  
 
Other than local churches and fellow Christians, North Korea 
related community groups and people have given their generous support 
for North Koreans who share the same hometown with the groups.  In 
Australia there are several associations consisting of those who were 
born, or had parents born in North Korea. They provide support for 
settlement, employment and scholarships for defectors and the children 
of defectors. Migration agents, migration lawyers and professional 
interpreters and translators also have been involved in support services 
for defectors. Ironically, North Koreans have left South Korea to erase 
the North Korean tag, however, to gain support from the Korean 
community and other groups, they need to stick to the North Korean 
identity.  
Despite these challenges and frustrations in Australia and more 
positive evaluation of South Korea, all interviewed for this research 
wanted to stay in Australia for a while or for good.  Some North 
Koreans explored other options for getting permanent residency - by 
marrying Australians, being enrolled in a university or college, or 
waiting for their children who were born in Australia to turn 10 years 
old. Once 10, their children gain Australian citizenship and there is a 
possibility that parents can get permanent residency through their 
children. Some North Koreans whose refugee claims were declined 
decided to leave this country only after they had exhausted all 
opportunities to get a permanent visa, or only leave if they were 
deported by the authorities. 
The complicated yet seemingly ambivalent reasons why they 
still stay in Australia despite the constraints need to be unpacked.  In the 
era of globalisation, English has become an essential skill for success 
and employment across the world, including South Korea. North Korean 
defectors, who are unlikely to have the social and cultural capital or 
financial resources to study overseas or send their children overseas to 
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learn English and further their education, take this onward migration or 
secondary asylum seeking opportunity seriously. Like many South 
Koreans with children studying in Australia, the growing power of 
English as a critical asset of occupational mobility, the problems of the 
intense exam-oriented high stakes Korean educational system, providing 
opportunities for children to learn English at an early age, and access to 
a better and more cosmopolitan education, are the reasons behind the 
hope in stay in Australia in spite of challenges. For some North 
Koreans, a low-status job, social isolation and sometimes extreme 
poverty can be acceptable trade-offs for their children's future. Even 
some participants for this research revealed that many North Korean 
refugees tried to apply for second asylum seeking to give their children 
and themselves a chance to live overseas and, experience cosmopolitan 
life, let alone to learn English. One male informant who supports the 
children of North Korean refugees told the researcher that while the 
application has been processed, asylum seekers, including their children, 
are entitled to attend school and English education. For example, it took 
more than four years for the painter asylum seeker to get the final 
decision about his application. Although their asylum seeking 
applications fail, they can at least have a cosmopolitan experience and 
language training during the processing period.  
 
 
Theoretical Implications of North Korean Refugee Cases or 
Migration Studies  
 
A close look into the multiple migration trajectory of North Korean 
refugees (from North Korea to China, China to South Korea, South 
Korea to Australia) and their experience at each location, challenges a 
linear migration view of one directional mobility from the national 
origin to destination. Rather, this research illustrates that the nature of 
migration is changing and includes multiple locations and different 
experiences and motivations behind mobility at each stage of migration. 
North Korean refugees’ onward migration confirms the multi-directional 
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The reality is that migratory journeys are multiple, 
iterative and fragmented, involving steps and stages. 
Return migration turns origins into destinations, and 
onward migration turns destinations into new origins, 
subverting the ‘origin–destination’ optic that frames 
much thinking about migration and its consequences. 
(p.14) 
 
The analysis of the temporal dimensions in their onward 
migration process implies that North Korean refugees exist somewhere 
in between the binaries like transients and permanent residents, 
migrants/refugees, asylum seekers/refugees, skilled/unskilled and 
legal/illegal. North Koreans often live in limbo and cut across the 
boundaries around the binary categories of permanent and temporary 
migration.  
Multi-directional flows of migration experience has enabled 
North Koreans refugees to develop new forms of migrant agency 
(initiating multiple asylum seeking and expanded yet often overlapping 
migrant subjectivities (playing strategically with multiple identities as 
South and North Korean, Asian and Cosmopolitan. Having already 
moved in another country once or twice, they have developed their 
‘migratory knowledge’ (Ramos 2017) to make a seemingly rational 
choice for another onward migration for their children and themselves. 
For North Korean refugees, 'the rational choice' they have made for 
onward migration can result in them living in limbo as temporal and 
illegal migrants and can involve downward mobility and trade-offs 
between their careers and their children's cosmopolitan experiences.  
As Bailey et al. (2002) have pointed out, North Koreans’ ‘being 
temporary’ at each location through their migration journey has an 
impact on their life in a settled country and being temporary serves as a 
mode of governmental ‘disciplining power.’ As discussed earlier, some 
live with fear of detention and deportation and experience no or little 
access to social welfare, health care and education as most social 
security programs and support are for permanent settler migrants.   
The scholars in the area of onward migration question the 
motivations behind the onward drive and if the motivations for onward 
migration are similar to, or different from, those of the first departure 
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from their home country. The North Korean case shows that while to 
access 'a better life' is a common push factor behind their transnational 
mobility from North Korea through China and/or South Korea to 
Australia, motivations may vary in each country along the transnational 
migration journey.  Economic necessity and survival may be the main 
reasons behind the escape from North Korea to China, while the move 
from China to South Korea seems to be more dominated by economic 
motivation and the South Korean government’s generous settlement 
programs.  For some North Korean refugees staying in China, their final 
destination has always been South Korea and China is just a transit 
country.  Whilst many North Koreans initially had only South Korea in 
their minds, but decided to onward-migrate to Australia and elsewhere 
due to their frustrations and dissatisfactions with life in South Korea, 
including the extremely competitive nature of society and the 
experience of discrimination and prejudice, in spite of assumed common 
ethnicity, culture, language and ancestry.   
The expectation of cosmopolitan life and desire to learn English 
for their children and themselves, plus accumulated migration 
knowledge have also driven North Koreans to onward migrate to 
Australia, with expectations that the social security system and social 
safety nets for refugees and migrants far exceed than those in South 
Korea.  Due to a small of number of cases, the findings from this 
research is preliminary. To understand how their temporal migration 
experiences will be constructed by the host country, age, gender, 
education, skills and family, far more large scale and transnational 
research into the specific experiences of North Korean onward migrants 
in different countries is warranted.   
 
 
Onward and Serial Migration of North Korean Refugees: Policy 
Implications 
 
The international community needs to develop consistent policies to 
effectively deal with ‘onward migration’ or ‘serial refugee claims’ by 
North Korean refugees. China should ensure the humanitarian treatment 
of North Korean defectors and grant human rights activists and 
international and South Korean NGOs permission to assist vulnerable 
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refugee populations from North Korea. China should also urgently 
revisit its policy of not acknowledging North Korean defectors as 
refugees based on the bilateral agreement it enacted with North Korea in 
1960. China joined both the “United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (CRSR)” in 1951 and the “Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugee in 1967”, and therefore has treaty obligations to 
recognise refugees and treat them humanely. Under the Refugee 
Convention, a person is deemed a refugee when he or she is outside her 
country of origin because of “a well-founded fear of being persecuted” 
in that country “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion” and therefore is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country 
(Cohen 2010). That means that North Koreans who cross into China 
with a well-founded fear of persecution on political, religious or other 
grounds should be considered refugees under the Refugee Convention, 
and not be forcibly returned to North Korea where their lives or freedom 
would be threatened. The Convention specifically prohibits their 
expulsion, except on grounds of national security or public order (Cohen 
2011).  
Even North Koreans crossing into China for reasons of 
economic hardship should be considered refugees, as North Korean 
economic policies are on a par with political persecution for those not 
part of the privileged political elite. Many of the North Koreans crossing 
into China during periods of famine were reported to come from the 
unprivileged classes, under the songbun “caste system” (Cohen 2010; 
Charny 2004). 
In any respect, many North Koreans outside their country fit the 
category of refugees sur place. As defined by the UNHCR, refugees sur 
place are not persons who are refugees when they leave their country. 
They become refugees at a later date because of a valid fear of 
persecution upon return. The North Koreans who leave their country for 
economic reasons can become refugees sur place if they have valid fears 
of persecution and harsh punishment upon return. In the case of North 
Koreans, this would not be difficult to prove. Their government deems it 
a criminal offence to leave the country without permission, and if they 
return they are likely to be arrested and detained, and while detained 
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suffer physical and sexual violence, forced labour, forced abortion, 
torture and in some cases death (Cohen 2010).  
One measure open to China is to consider granting Special 
Resident Visas to those North Koreans who have stable employment and 
shelter. Some North Koreans wish to stay in China where there is 
cultural compatibility and geographic proximity to their North Korean 
home, relatives and friends (RI 2005)5. More urgently, China should 
grant legal residency to the spouses of Chinese citizens and their 
children (Charny 2004) and should not send them back to North Korea.  
As the most common first asylum country for North Korean 
defectors, China should allow the UNHCR access to determine the 
refugee status of the North Koreans living there. China also should 
allow aid agencies access to the border region. After all, the UNHCR 
has offered assistance and South Korea is willing to resettle North 
Korean refugees (Ji  2011). Other adjacent states should equally provide 
assistance to North Korean defectors and work together with 
international institutions and NGOs.  
In addition, it is expected the US North Korean Child Welfare 
Act will play a critical role in advocating for and protecting North 
Korean children. In January 2013, President Obama signed the North 
Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012. This Act was introduced to assist 
stateless North Korean children who face starvation and neglect because 
they are neither North Korean citizens nor citizens of the country where 
they currently reside. The Act is expected to underpin strategies to help 
reunite North Korean refugee children with their families or facilitate 
their adoption by citizens of South Korea, China or other countries. 
Many of these children have Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers 
but are not claimed by either parent. Being stateless, they cannot access 
the education, health and welfare services of either country. This Act 
will also help provide for their immediate care and begin the process of 
permanent settlement. Those who make it to South Korea are provided 
an education, a path to citizenship and even a chance at adoption. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Two North Koreans we interviewed in China want to live in China rather than 
going to South Korea so that they can support their families in North Korea.  
27 
 
International Review of Korean Studies Vol.14, No.1, 2017 
Serial Migration or Repeated Refugee Claims 
 
It appears that most countries have begun to take more stringent 
measures in the screening process of North Korean refugee claimants to 
filter out fraudulent refugee claimants. For Canada and the UK, 
decisions on granting asylum to North Korean re-migrants have been 
arbitrary. Australia, meanwhile, seems to be pursuing a hard-line on this 
issue, refusing to grant asylum to any North Koreans arriving from 
South Korea (Bell 2013).  For instance, the UK government rejects the 
application of defectors who already have South Korean citizenship or 
are supposed to apply for that citizenship. The UK also requires those 
defectors to provide their fingerprints in order to check whether they 
came to the UK via South Korea.  In 2008, the UK deported North 
Korean defectors who claimed that they came directly from North 
Korea but actually had resided in South Korea (Choi 2011). The United 
States also adopted more stringent screening of North Korean refugee 
claimants to curtail the serial or repeated migration of North Korean 
refugees.  
In principle, given the extraordinary situation of North Korean 
defectors, special consideration is given to them by the international 
community when reviewing refugee applications, and special migrant 
visas will be considered for North Korean asylum seekers on 
humanitarian grounds. Unlike other asylum seekers, they are from a 
country so reclusive that they are barely aware of the outside world. It 
seems hardly possible for North Korean asylum seekers who arrive in 
Southeast Asia from China to make informed choices and have accurate 
information about resettlement programs in other countries as well as 
South Korea. North Koreans should be provided with accurate 
information before making a decision whether or not to become South 
Korean citizens (Cohen 2011; Bell 2013). For example, they should 
know that the waiting time to go to a country other than South Korea, 
while in a Thai, Burmese or Mongolian detention centre is considerably 
longer than opting for South Korea (Bell 2013). 
In particular, the US needs to make efforts to grant more North 
Koreans refugee visas based on the NKHRA. As of 2011, the US had 
admitted only 122 North Korean refugees since the adoption of NKHRA 
in 2004. The US should consider ways of allowing North Korean 
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defectors in South Korea to resettle in the US, in close cooperation with 
the South Korean government (Cohen 2011). For all North Koreans in 
foreign countries other than China and South Korea, a blanket, one-off 
amnesty with permission to remain is a possible option until further 
internationally consistent policies for North Korean defectors’ multiple 
refugee claims can be developed. According to the report of the 
UNHCR, Global Trend 2012, there are 1027 North Korean Asylum 
cases pending for decision (UNHCR 2013). 
Another positive measure would be to provide accurate 
information and resources for those who wish to leave South Korea for 
another country. This could be done with the cooperation of the South 
Korean government and through various NGO networks. This may have 
the effect of reducing the number of unsuccessful serial refugee claims 
and a higher number of North Koreans choosing officially sanctioned 
methods to migration to other countries. As suggested by the interviews 
with North Korean defectors in Australia, they wished to move here for 
a better life and better opportunities – just as South Koreans have done 
in the past. Their attempt to leave South Korea should not be seen as a 
betrayal.  For them to make an informed decision and not get misled by 
brokers’ exaggerated or unreliable information, South Korea needs to 
provide information on legal migration processes as well as the life and 
experiences of migrants to other countries. In fact, a number of North 
Koreans have been detained in detention centres6 and deported to South 
Korea.  
Support programs such as scholarships, exchange programs and 
English language classes for North Korean defectors living in South 
Korea would help them find work and adapt to life in South Korea. For 
example, the British Embassy in Seoul has been running a free English 
language program, "English for the Future", for North Korean defectors 
since June 2010. This is done in cooperation with the Unification 
Ministry, the Pony Chung Foundation, the Asan Foundation, LG 
Corporation, and Korea Investment and Securities. Students are also 
given an opportunity of a three-month internship with one of 11 sponsor 
                                                          
6 When the researcher visited the Villawood Detention Centre in Sydney in 
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organisations, and study in the UK on a scholarship. The NKHRA 
(North Korean Human Rights Act) will be used to support a wide range 
of programs as well as humanitarian assistance for North Koreans 
outside of North Korea. 
Adversity for North Koreans does not necessarily end after 
fleeing their country. In China, they are treated as illegal migrants and 
live under constant fear of repatriation and arrest. Some are victims of 
trafficking and sexual violence. In South Korea, they are among the 
most socially disadvantaged, often unemployed and subject to 
discrimination and prejudice. For those who move to other countries as 
asylum seekers such as the UK, Canada, the US, Australia and EU 
countries, their lives in their newly adopted countries are not what was 
initially expected. Contrary to ungrounded information obtained through 
friends and brokers claiming that a refugee visa or humanitarian visa 
would easily be granted, in reality, it is almost impossible to gain a 
refugee protection visa in Australia and elsewhere. Despite these 
challenges, these North Koreans stay in Australia for as long as possible, 
no matter how bad their situations become, because of their wish to shed 
their North Korean identity, which has served as a source of prejudice 
and discrimination in South Korea, and to offer a better opportunity for 
their children and themselves.  
Serial refugee claims made by North Koreans have recently 
attracted international attention. The absence of specific policies toward 
North Korean refugees, and inconsistent refugee review criteria and 
interpretation by countries, have left some refugees living in very dire 
situations. Constrained by temporal/ legal status, they are often subject 
to deportation, detention and arrest. International policies and 
humanitarian solutions should be urgently developed to deal with the 
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